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Abstract. We study linking attacks on communication protocols. We
show that an active attacker is strictly more powerful in this setting than
previously-considered passive attackers. We introduce a formal model to
reason about active linkability attacks, formally define security against
these attacks and give very general conditions for both security and in-
security of protocols. In addition, we introduce a composition-like tech-
nique that allows to obtain security proofs by only studying small com-
ponents of a protocol.
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1 Introduction
A typical goal of a protocol using web services is to compute values based
on information that is distributed among several parties: A user may
have a specific set of input values, a web service then can compute, given
these values, a function whose result—possibly combined with further
data supplied by the user—is then used as an input to a further web
service.
Such protocols can be synthesized to respect the privacy of individual
values (e.g., address or credit card number) [BCFG07,BMPR11].
In addition to privacy of values, a crucial aspect in such a setting is
linkability : If an adversary can connect different values to the same user
session, this may be a privacy violation. For example, it might be harmless
if an adversary knows customer names and products sold by a shop as long
as these values cannot be linked, i.e., the adversary does not learn who
ordered what. Linkability has been studied in the context of eHealth pro-
tocols [DJP12] and anonymous internet usage [BPW12], similar privacy-
relation questions have been considered in [NS08,Swe02,ACRR10,EM13].
To the best of our knowledge, work on linkability up to now only
studied what an adversary can deduce who does not interfere with the
actual protocol run. Such attacks by an “honest-but-curious” adversary
are passive. We show that these attacks have an active counterpart: An
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adversary involved in the actual protocol run is strictly more powerful.
(We are not concerned with active attacks on the cryptographic security
of the protocols, there is of course a large literature on such attacks).
We contribute to the development of the theory of linkability by in-
troducing active linking attacks. Our contributions are as follows:
– We define a formal model that takes into account anonymous channels
and nested web service queries.
– We give a formal definition of active linking attacks, and formalize a
class of such attacks, which we call tracking strategies.
– We demonstrate an embedding technique which generalizes composi-
tion. This technique can be used to simplify security proofs.
– For a large, natural class of protocols, we give a complete charac-
terization of secure protocols and possible attacks: Active linkability
attacks can be mounted if and only if tracking strategies exist.
There are technical similarities between our security proofs and results
on lossless decomposition of databases, where complete database tuples
can be reproduced from partial ones [MMS79,ABU79]. However, in the
database setting, the notion of an active attacker is not studied.
1.1 An Example
C→ S : (product)
S→ C : p = parceltype(product)
C→ D : (p, address)
D→ C : deliveryprice(p, address)
Fig. 1: Simple Protocol τex
A customer C with address wants to
learn the shipping cost for product or-
dered from shop S with shipping com-
pany service D. C knows the values
address and product, S knows the func-
tion parceltype, determining the type of
parcel p = parceltype(product) needed
to package product, p is a number between 0 and some n. The com-
pany D knows the function deliveryprice determining the shipping cost
deliveryprice(p, address) of a parcel of type p to address. This setting yields
the straight-forward protocol given in Figure 1. (We abstract from cryp-
tographic properties and assume secure channels between all parties.)
C expects that S and D cannot link product and address, even if they
work together: S learns product but not address; D learns address but
not product. If many users run the protocol in parallel and C cannot
be identified by his IP address (e.g., uses an anonymity service), and C
waits a while between his two messages to avoid linking simply due to
timing, then ideally S and D should be unable to determine which of their
respective queries come from the same customer.
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This reasoning is indeed correct for a passive attacker. However, it
overlooks that S and D control part of the user’s data—namely the value
p—and therefore can mount the following active attack:
1. S replies to the first received query with a 0, every later query is
answered with a 1. S stores the value of product from the first query.
2. D waits for a query of the form (0, address) and sends address to S.
3. S knows that address received from D comes from the same user as
the first query and hence can link this user’s address and product.
This allows S and D to produce a “matching” pair of address and
product, even with many parallel protocol runs and anonymous connec-
tions from C to S and D. After one such run, the value 0 can be used
to track another session. Similarly, n − 1 sessions can be tracked in par-
allel. The strategy can be refined in order to track a session in which a
particular product was ordered. The attack uses the 0-value for p as a
“session cookie” that identifies a particular session. We stress that this
attack does not violate a cryptographic property, but abuses control over
user data to violate a privacy property of the protocol. In particular, this
attack cannot be avoided by purely cryptographic means.
parceltype
xproduct xaddress
deliveryprice
Fig. 2: Model of τex
This paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion 2, we introduce our protocol model and
state our security definition. In Section 3, we
generalize the above strategy to tracking strate-
gies, which can be applied to a large class
of protocols. In Section 4, we present tech-
niques to prove security of protocols, includ-
ing a detailed proof for an example protocol,
two general results for what “flat” protocols, a
composition-like technique we call embedding, and generalizations of our
security results to non-flat protocols. In Section 5, we briefly discuss and
characterize a generalization of our security notion. We then conclude, in
Section 6, with some ideas for further research.
2 Protocol model
Our model provides anonymous channels between the user and each web
service, since linking is trivial if the user can be identified by e.g., an
IP address. For simplicity, we assume that all web services relevant for
a protocol are controlled by a single adversary. To model interleaving of
messages from different users, we introduce a scheduler who determines
the order in which messages are delivered.
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g
f2f1 f3
a1 a2 b1 b2 c1 c2
Fig. 3: A protocol
The security of a protocol depends
on the structure of the nested queries
to the involved web services. Since
query results can be used as inputs
for later queries, we model a protocol
as a directed acyclic graph. Each node
in this graph represents a query to a
single web service such as parceltype
and deliveryprice in the above example.
Typically, these have some semantics
describing the web service. However, we take the (pessimistic) point of
view that the adversary ignores these semantics and replies only with the
goal to maximize her attack chances. Therefore, our formal treatment
does not fix any semantics for the functions computed in a protocol; we
only distinguish between variable nodes (these model user input values)
and query nodes (these model queries to web services).
An edge u → f in a protocol models that the value of u (either an
input value or a query result) is used as input to f . For simplicity, we
assume that all values and query results in τ are Boolean; other values
can be modelled by introducing function domains or by encoding them as
sequences of Booleans. User’s input values are represented in the protocol
using variables, these are the special nodes from Vars(τ). The represen-
tation of a protocol is similar to Boolean circuits (see [Vol99]).
Definition 2.1. A protocol is a directed acyclic graph τ = (V,E) with a
subset ∅ 6= Vars(τ) ⊆ V such that each node in Vars(τ) has in-degree 0.
In Figure 2, the protocol τex from the introduction is formalized in
our model, another example is presented in Figure 3. Our protocols do
not fix the order of requests to different services (except that if f1 → f2
is an edge in τ , each user must query f1 before f2). However, our results
also hold for the case that the protocol fixes a query order.
We call nodes of τ without outgoing edges output nodes. If τ only has
a single output-node, this node is the root of τ . We often identify τ and
its set of nodes, i.e., talk about nodes f ∈ τ and subsets τ ′ ⊆ τ . For
u, v ∈ τ , we write u v if there is a directed path from u to v.
For f ∈ τ , Vars(f) denotes {x ∈ Vars(τ) | x f is a path in τ}, i.e.,
the set of input values that influence the queries made at the node f . For
a set S ⊆ τ , with Vars(S) we denote the set ∪u∈SVars(u).
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2.1 Protocol execution
We first informally describe how a protocol τ is executed in our model. We
identify a user with her local session containing her input values: A user
or local session is an assignment I : Vars(τ) → {0, 1}. During a protocol
run, users store the results of queries. To model this, local sessions will
be extended to assignments I : τ → {0, 1}. For a non-variable node f ∈ τ ,
the value I(f) then contains the query result of f for user I. Assign is
the set of all such assignments I : V → {0, 1}, where V ⊆ τ .
A run or global session of τ is based on a multiset S = {I1, . . . , Im} of
users. Each Ii performs a query for each non-variable node f of τ as fol-
lows: Let u1, . . . , un be the predecessor nodes of f (uj represents a user’s
input value if uj ∈ Vars(τ), and a result of a preceeding query otherwise).
The arguments for the f -query are the user’s values for u1, . . . , un, i.e., the
values Ii(u1), . . . , Ii(un). The query consists of the pair (f, (Ii(u1), . . . , Ii(un))).
Hence the adversary learns which service the user queries and the argu-
ments for this query, but does not see the value i identifying the user.
The adversary can reply to Ii’s f -query immediately or first wait for
further queries. When she eventually replies with the bit r, the user stores
this reply: We model this by extending Ii with the value Ii(f) = r.
An adversary strategy chooses one of three options in every situation:
1. reply to a previously-received user query,
2. wait for the next query (even if there are unanswered queries),
3. print an I ∈ Assign; the adversary wins if I ∈ S, and fails otherwise.
Schedules and Global Sessions Queries can be performed in any order
that queries the predecessors of each node before the node itself. Formally,
an n-user schedule for τ is a sequence of pairs (i, f) where i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
f ∈ τ \Vars(τ) where each such pair appears exactly once, and if f → g
is an edge in τ with f /∈ Vars(τ), then (i, f) appears in τ before (i, g).
The pair (i, f) represents the f -query of the ith user.
A global session for τ is a pair (S, σ) where S is a multiset of local
sessions for τ , and σ is a |S|-user schedule for τ .
Protocol state. A protocol state contains complete information about a
protocol run so far. It is defined as a pair (s, σ), where s is a sequence over
τ×Assign×N×{0, 1,⊥}×(N∪{⊥}) and σ is a suffix of a schedule encoding
the queries remaining to be performed. An element si = (f, I, i, r, t) in s
encodes the f -query of user Ii as described above, here I is the assignment
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defined as I(u) = Ii(u) for all u ∈ τ where u → f is an edge in τ . The
value r is the adversary’s reply to the query, t records the time of the
reply (both r and t are ⊥ for a yet unanswered query).
The initial state of a global session (S, σ) is ((f, ∅, 1,⊥, |S|), σ) for
some f ∈ τ ; this initializes σ and tells the adversary the number of users.
Two types of events modify the protocol state: A user can perform
a query, and the adversary can reply to a query. (The adversary’s print-
action ends the protocol run). The above-discussed query of a service
f ∈ τ by user Ii can be performed in a global state (s, σ) where the
first element of σ is (i, f). This action adds the tuple (f, I, i,⊥,⊥) to
the sequence s, where I encodes the input values for f (see above), and
removes the first element of σ. In a state (s, σ), if s contains an element
sk = (f, I, i,⊥,⊥) representing an unanswered query by Ii, the adver-
sary’s reply to this query with bit r exchanges sk in s with the tuple
(f, I, i, r, t), if this is the t-th action performed in the protocol run. Ad-
ditionally, as discussed above, the assignment Ii is then extended with
Ii(xf ) = r. The remaining schedule is unchanged.
Adversary knowledge and strategies. An adversary strategy is a con-
ditional plan which, for each protocol state (s, σ), chooses an adversary
action to take. This action may only depend on information available to
the adversary, which is defined by view ((s, σ)) obtained from s by erasing
each tuple’s third component and ignoring σ. This models that the ad-
versary has complete information except for the index of the user session
from which a request originates and the remaining schedule. An adversary
strategy for τ is a function Π whose inputs are elements view ((s, σ)) for
a state (s, σ) of τ , and the output is one of the above actions (wait, reply
to element sk with r, print assignment I), with the following restrictions:
– reply can only be chosen if s contains an unanswered query (f, I, i,⊥,⊥),
– wait is only available if the first query in σ can be performed, i.e., the
first element of σ is (i, f) where Ii(u) is defined for all u with u→ f .
1
For a global session and an adversary strategy, the resulting τ -run
is defined as the resulting sequence of states arising from performing Π
stepwise, until the remaining schedule is empty and all queries have been
answered, or the adversary’s print action has been performed.
1 Whether wait is available does not follow from view ((s, σ)). We can extend
view ((s, σ)) with a flag for the availability of wait, for simplification we omit this.
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Definition 2.2. A protocol τ is insecure if there is a strategy Π such
that for every global session (S, σ) of τ , an action print(I) for some I ∈ S
occurs during the τ -run for (S, σ) with strategy Π. Otherwise, τ is secure.
3 Insecure Protocols: Tracking Strategies
We now generalize the tracking strategy discussed in the introduction.
That strategy used the value 0 produced by parceltype as a “session
cookie” to track the input values of a designated user session. In our
definition below, the node tinit plays the role of parceltype in the earlier
example. At this node, tracking a user session is initialized by first reply-
ing with the session cookie: When the first tinit-query in a global session
is performed, the adversary replies with the session cookie’s value, 0. The
adversary stores the user’s values used as arguments to tinit, this gives
a partial assignment Itrack which is later extended by additional values:
When the user later queries a node f with tinit → f with the value 0 for
the argument representing tinit’s value, this query belongs to the tracked
user session. The arguments for this f -query that contain the values of
additional variables are then used to extend the assignment Itrack, and the
query is answered with the session cookie to allow tracking this session in
the remainder of the protocol. In general, the f -query will not have fur-
ther user values as input, but instead receive return values from different
queries. However, since the adversary controls the replies to these queries
as well, she can use them to simply “forward” the value of a user vari-
able. If the values of all user variables can be forwarded to a node where
tracking in the above sense happens, then by repeating these actions,
the adversary eventually extends Itrack to a complete local session, which
constitutes a successful active linkability attack. The following definition
captures the protocols for which this attack is successful:
Definition 3.1. A set T ⊆ τ is called a tracking strategy if the following
conditions hold:
1. Synchronization condition: There is a  -smallest element tinit in T ,
i.e. for every u ∈ T we have tinit  u.
2. Cover condition: For every x ∈ Vars(τ) there is a path px such that:
(a) x t via path px for some t ∈ T
(b) if x 6= y, then px and py do not share a node from the set τ \ T
The set T contains the nodes which perform tracking, i.e., which use
the session cookie as reply to track the user session. The remaining nodes
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are used to simply forward one input value of the user to a later part in
the protocol. The cover condition guarantees that all input variables can
be forwarded in this fashion.
The synchronization condition requires some node tinit that can ini-
tialize tracking. The strategy then ensures that the session cookie used
by each node in T identifies the same session. This cookie is passed on
to tracking nodes appearing later in the protocol run (indirectly via the
users, who echo results of a query f for all g with f → g). Without such
a tinit the adversary might use the session cookie for different partial user
sessions that do not necessarily originate from the same local session.
g
f1 f2
x y u v
Fig. 4: No synchro-
nization
Consider the example in Figure 4. We demon-
strate that there is no tracking strategy for this
protocol. In a tracking strategy, both f1 and f2
must be tracking in order to capture all input
bits. Both f1 and f2 then each collect a partial
local session and use the session cookie 0 to iden-
tify these. The adversary then waits for a query
g(0, 0)—however, such a query may never happen:
If the initial queries at f1 and f2 belong to dif-
ferent user sessions, then two g-queries g(1, 0) and
g(0, 1) will occur, which belong to different local sessions. We will show
in Example 4.1 that this protocol does not only fail to have a tracking
strategy, but is indeed secure: The adversary does not have any strategy
for a successful linkability attack.
g
f1 f2
tinit
w x y z
Fig. 5: tinit is a synchro-
nizer
The situation is different for the protocol in
Figure 5, where a synchronizer tinit is placed
before f1 and f2: tinit is the first node to see any
data to be tracked, and generates the cookie
which is then passed on to f1 and f2; both f1
and f2 will at some point see a zero as its tinit-
arguments. Then they contribute their knowl-
edge to the local session Itrack, since now they
know they all work on the same local session.
Therefore, T = {tinit, f1, f2} is a tracking
strategy for the protocol in Figure 5. The syn-
chronization condition is satisfied, since every node in T can be reached
from tinit via a directed path, the cover condition is satisfied as well.
In this strategy, tinit keeps track of the first encountered values of
x and y, which are stored in Itrack. The node f1 waits for a zero in its
second argument and adds the received value for w to Itrack. Analogously,
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f2 waits for a zero in its first argument and stores z. After both f1 and
f2 have received this zero, Itrack is a complete assignment. The adversary
thus can print the linked local session. Note that the root node is not
involved in this process: The protocol remains insecure even without g.
A protocol for which a tracking strategy exists is always insecure:
Theorem 3.2. Let τ be a protocol such that there exists a tracking strat-
egy for τ . Then τ is insecure.
We conjecture that the converse of Theorem 3.2 holds as well, i.e., that
a protocol is insecure if and only if a tracking strategy exists. For a large
class of protocols, we have proved this conjecture, see Theorem 4.3. Also,
whether a tracking strategy exists for a protocol can be tested efficiently
with a standard application of network flow algorithms.
w x y z
I1 1 0 0 1
I2 0 0 0 0
Fig. 6: I1, I2
We want to discuss one final point about the protocol
from Figure 5, namely that the adversary’s strategy here
must be inconsistent in the following sense: Even when
two local sessions agree on the values for x and y, the
strategy chooses diffeent replies to their tinit-queries. To
see that this is necessary, consider a global session comprising only the
two local sessions shown in Figure 6 and a schedule as follows:
1. First, I1 queries tinit, which yields I1(tinit) = 0 because tinit is track-
ing. The adversary stores Itrack(x) = 0 and Itrack(y) = 0.
2. Next, I2 queries tinit, which gives I2(tinit) = 0 because of consistency
and I1 and I2 agree on x and y.
3. Lastly, I1 queries f1 with values I1(w) = 1 and I1(tinit) = 0, which
gives 0 since f1 is tracking and has not been queried before. The
adversary stores Itrack(w) = 1. Analogously, I2 queries f2 with values
I2(z) = 0 and I2(z) = 0, which also yields zero because of tracking.
The adversary stores Itrack(z) = 0.
Now that both f1 and f2 have done their tracking, they combine their
knowledge and print the local session. We see that consistent behavior in
this case yields the output {w = 1, x = y = z = 0}, which is wrong.
4 Secure Protocols and Security Proofs
We now present criteria implying security of protocols. We start with flat
protocols in Section 4.1, for which we give a complete example security
proof, and state two general security results. In Section 4.2, we provide
an embedding technique that allows to prove security of more complex
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protocols. We apply this technique in Section 4.3 to lift our results for
flat protocols to protocols with arbitrary depth.
4.1 Secure Flat Protocols: An Example and Two Results
A protocol is flat if it has a root and its depth (i.e., length of longest
directed path) is 2. See Figure 3 for an example. A flat protocol can be
written2 as τ = g(f1(
−→x1), . . . , fn(
−→xn)), where
−→xi is a sequence of variables
(−→xi and
−→xj are not necessarily disjoint). For example, the protocol from
Figure 3 can be written as g(f1(a1, a2, b1), f2(b1, b2, c1), f3(c1, c2, a1)).
We now present an example and two classes of secure flat protocols.
Example 4.1. The protocol τ = g(f1(x, y), f2(u, v)) (see Fig. 4) is secure.
x y u v g-query
I1 0 0 0 0 (0, γ)
I2 0 1 0 1 (0, δ)
I3 1 0 1 0 (α, 0)
I4 1 1 1 1 (β, 0)
x y u v g-query
I1 0 0 0 1 (0, δ)
I2 0 1 0 0 (0, γ)
I3 1 0 1 1 (α, 0)
I4 1 1 1 0 (β, 0)
Fig. 7: Two Global Sessions for τ
As discussed above, there is
no tracking strategy in the sense
of Definition 3.1 for τ . We now
show that τ is indeed secure, i.e.,
there is no strategy at all for τ .
Proof. We only consider global
sessions consisting of 4 different
local sessions I1, . . . , I4, where
each Boolean combination ap-
pears as input to f1 and f2: For each α, β ∈ {0, 1}, there is some Ii with
Ii(x) = α and Ii(y) = β, and a session Ij with Ij(u) = α and Ij(v) = β.
We only consider schedules σ that first perform all f1-queries, then all
f2-queries followed by all g-queries, and perform the queries for each ser-
vice in lexicographical order. It suffices to show that the adversary does
not have a strategy for this case, clearly then a general strategy does not
exist either. In sessions as above, the adversary always receives the same
set of queries for f1 and f2; therefore these queries contain no information
for the adversary. Since no fi is queried more than once with the same
arguments, we only need to consider consistent strategies. As a result,
each adversary strategy Π consists of functions f1, f2 : {0, 1}
2 → {0, 1}
and a rule for the print action. We construct, depending on f1 and f2, a
global session where Π fails. Hence let f1 and f2 be functions as above.
Since f1 and f2 cannot be injective, we assume without loss of gener-
ality that f1(0, 0) = f1(0, 1) = 0 and f2(1, 0) = f2(1, 1) = 0. We further
define α = f1(1, 0), β = f1(1, 1), γ = f2(0, 0), and δ = f2(0, 1).
2 One can without loss of generality assume that there is no variable x and an edge
x → g for the output node g of a flat protocol.
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Now consider the global sessions in Figure 7, with a schedule as above.
For local sessions appearing, the tables list the values of the protocol vari-
ables as well as the parameters for the resulting query at the node g, which
for the local session Ii consists of the pair (f1(Ii(x), Ii(y)), f2(Ii(u), Ii(v))).
These g-queries are observed by the adversary. It turns out that for both
global sessions, the adversary makes the exact same observations: At both
f1 and f2, each Boolean pair is queried exactly once; the queries at g are
(0, γ), (0, σ), (α, 0), and (β, 0)—all performed in lexicographical order.
Therefore, the adversary cannot distinguish these sessions and his strat-
egy prints out the same assignment in both global sessions. Since the
sessions have disjoint sets of local sessions, the adversary fails in at least
one of them; the protocol is indeed secure. ⊓⊔
The ideas from the above proof can be generalized to give the following
theorem. Its proof is technically more involved in part due to the fact
that here, we have to consider inconsistent adversary strategies. Roughly,
the theorem states that if a flat protocol can be partitioned into two
variable-disjoint components, neither of which grant the adversary enough
“channels” to forward all user inputs to the output node, then it is secure.
Theorem 4.2. Let τ be a protocol of the form τ = g(f1(
−→x1), . . . , fn(
−→xn)),
such that {1, . . . , n} = I1 ∪ I2 with
– if i ∈ I1 and j ∈ I2, then
−→xi ∩
−→xj = ∅,
–
∣∣∪i∈Ij−→xi∣∣ > |Ij | ≥ 1 for j ∈ {1, 2}.
Then τ is secure.
We now consider flat protocols τ = g(f1(
−→x1), . . . , fn(
−→xn)) where each
fi has a private variable. This is a variable x ∈
−→xi \∪j 6=i
−→xj , i.e., a variable
that is an input to fi, but not an input to any of the other fj. For these
protocols we show that the converse of Theorem 3.2 is true as well: If
there is no tracking strategy for τ , then the protocol is secure.
Theorem 4.3. Let τ be a flat protocol where each fi has a private vari-
able. Then τ is insecure if and only if a tracking strategy for τ exists.
The proof of Theorem 4.3 converts τ to a normal form, and applies a
rather involved combinatorial construction to construct a global session
(S, σ) such that for every local session I ∈ S, there is a global session
(SI , σI) which is indistinguishable from (S, σ) for the adversary but does
not contain I. Due to this indistinguishability, each adversary strategy
has to print the same local session on (S, σ) and each (SI , σI), and hence
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fails on (S, σ) or on some (SI , σI). The simplest non-trivial example for
which Theorem 4.3 implies security is the protocol shown in Figure 3,
which itself already requires a surprisingly complex security proof.
4.2 A Notion of Composition
We introduce an embedding technique to compare security of protocols: If
a copy of a secure protocol τ ′ appears as a (loosely speaking) “component”
of a protocol τ , then τ is secure as well—provided that the “copy” of τ ′
plays a meaningful part in τ : The copy must have control over its input
data, and be applied to “relevant” input values.
This notion is interesting for several reasons. First, it is a powerful
tool to prove security of protocols into which a known secure protocol
can be embedded (see Section 4.3 for such applications). Second, em-
bedding is closely related to composition, a technique establishing impli-
cations between the security of a protocol and its components. Various
notions of composition have been successfully applied in the study of
cryptographic protocols [Can01,BPW03,cCC10,CDKR13]. Usually, com-
position uses the output of one protocol as input for others. In a sense,
embedding is more general, as it also captures the case where (copies of)
the nodes of the embedded protocol τ ′ appear spread out over different
parts of the “large” protocol τ .
Our embedding notion only requires one component of the composed
protocol to be secure, whereas composition techniques usually compose
a number of secure protocols to obtain another, equally secure, protocol.
The reason for this difference lies in our notion of security: In a linkability
attack, the adversary needs to reconstruct a complete user session to be
successful. Clearly, if a subset of the user’s variables is protected by a
secure sub-protocol, then even complete knowledge of all other values does
not help the adversary. In contrast, definitions of cryptographic security
in the literature usually require that the adversary cannot attack any
part of the protocol, in which case a single insecure sub-protocol usually
renders the entire protocol insecure. See Section 5 for a relaxation of the
requirement that the adversary must construct a complete user session.
We now state our embedding definition and then discuss it in detail.
For a function ϕ : τ ′ → τ , with ϕ(τ ′) we denote the set {ϕ(u) | u ∈ τ ′}.
Definition 4.4. Let τ and τ ′ be protocols. A function ϕ : τ ′ → τ is an
embedding of τ ′ into τ , if the following holds:
– If v ∈ τ ′ is a node of τ ′ with a successor in τ ′ and ϕ(v) u is a path
in τ , then there is some w ∈ τ ′ such that u ϕ(w) is a path in τ .
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– If u 6= v ∈ τ ′ with a path ϕ(u) ϕ(v) in τ whose intermediate nodes
are not elements of ϕ(τ ′), then there is an edge u→ v in τ ′.
– there is an injective function χ : Vars(τ ′) → Vars(τ) such that for
each x ∈ Vars(τ ′), there is a path χ(x)  ϕ(x) in τ , and if x, y ∈
Vars(τ ′) with χ(x)  w, χ(y)  w are paths in τ , then there is a
node g ∈ τ ′ \ Vars(τ ′) such that both of these paths visit ϕ(g).
The definition requires ϕ(τ ′), which is the copy of τ ′ appearing in τ ,
to have sufficient control a set of revelant user input values:
1. Part one of the definition states that when information ultimately
leaves ϕ(τ ′), it does so through the output interface of τ ′. Hence ϕ(τ ′)
retains some control over its data, even though data may be processed
by nodes from τ \ϕ(τ ′) in the meantime. This prevents “internal” data
of ϕ(τ ′) from being copied to τ \ ϕ(τ ′) without any control by ϕ(τ ′).
2. The second point requires that in ϕ(τ ′), there are no connections that
do not appear in the original protocol τ ′. This is needed since e.g.,
the transitive closure of almost every protocol is insecure.
3. The third part demands that ϕ(τ ′) is used on “exclusive” data: Each
variable x of τ ′ must correspond to some χ(x) ∈ Vars(τ), such that
χ(x) and χ(y) can be linked only through their interaction within
ϕ(τ ′). Otherwise, security of τ ′ cannot prevent linking χ(x) and χ(y).
Embedding preserves security: A protocol with a secure component is
secure itself. Hence, to prove a protocol secure, it suffices to find a secure
component which then forms an obstruction to any adversary strategy.
Theorem 4.5. Let τ ′ be a secure protocol with a root, and let ϕ be an
embedding of τ ′ into a protocol τ . Then τ is secure as well.
The proof of Theorem 4.5 shows that τ ′ can be obtained from τ by a
sequence of insecurity-preserving transformations. Hence, if τ is insecure,
then τ ′ is insecure as well. Technically, the proof uses fairly natural trans-
lations of strategies between different intermediate protocols, however we
have to be careful to account for inconsistent strategies.
As an example, we discuss one of these transformations, which we call
cloning. This discussion also allows to compare security of two different
protocol approaches.
Cloning is used in the proof of Theorem 4.5 in the case that ϕ(u) =
ϕ(v) = w for some nodes u and v of τ ′ with u 6= v. Since the goal of the
transformation is to obtain exactly the protocol τ ′, the nodes ϕ(u) and
ϕ(v) have to be “separated” in τ . To this end, cloning introduces a new
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“copy” w′ of w with the same predecessors as w into τ , and replaces some
edges w→ t with edges w′ → t. The result is a protocol where instead of
caching the w-result and reusing the value as input for later queries, the
user performs the query to w again. Clearly, this is not a good idea as the
adversary gains additional opportunities to interfere. We give an example
showing that cloning can indeed introduce insecurities into a previously
secure protocol.
g
f3
f1 f2
x y u v
Fig. 8: Protocol τsec
g
f3
f1 f
′
1 f2
x y u v
Fig. 9: Protocol τinsec
Consider the protocols τsec and τinsec from Figures 8 and 9. τinsec is the
result of cloning f1 in τsec, the copy is called f
′
1. In the original protocol
τsec, the answer to the query of f1 is used as input for both the f3 and
the g-queries. In contrast, the protocol τinsec contains the same query to
f1 (whose result is used in the later f3-query) and a further query to f
′
1,
using the same input values as the f1-query (namely x and y). The result
of this query is used as input for the g-query. This change to the protocol
introduces insecurity: While τsec is secure, the protocol τinsec is insecure.
Hence cloning preserves insecurity, but does not preserve security.
To see that τsec is secure, first note that the node f3 can be removed
without affecting security. In the resulting protocol, g receives two copies
of the result of f1(x, y), which is equivalent to g only getting a single copy
of that bit. This protocol is identical to the one from Figure 4, and hence
τsec is secure by Example 4.1.
On the other hand, τinsec has a tracking strategy given by T = {tinit, g},
with tinit = f2. Therefore, τinsec is insecure due to Theorem 3.2.
This shows that introducing an additional query into a secure protocol
can render the protocol insecure, even if the exact same set of input values
for the new query is already used for an existing query in the protocol.
Therefore, queries to an adversial network should be kept to a minimum.
4.3 Security Proofs for Deeper Protocols
We now use Theorem 4.5, to “lift” the results obtained for flat protocols
in Section 4.1 to protocols of arbitrary depth. For simplicity, we only
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consider layered protocols τ , i.e., τ = L0 ∪ · · · ∪Ln, where Li ∩Lj = ∅ for
i 6= j, each predecessor of a node in Li is in Li+1, and variable nodes only
appear in Ln. One can easily rewrite every protocol into a layered one
without affecting security. Our first result in this section generalizes our
security result for flat protocols that consist of two “disjoint” components
(Theorem 4.2) to protocols of arbitrary depth:
Corollary 4.6. Let τ be a layered protocol with levels L0, . . . , Ln with
some i such that Li = I1∪I2 with Vars(I1)∩Vars(I2) = ∅ and |Vars(I1)| >
|I1|, |Vars(I2)| > |I2|. Then τ is secure.
Our result on flat protocols g(f1(
−→x1), . . . , fn(
−→xn)) where each of the fi
has a private variable can be generalized as follows. Note that for such a
protocol, a tracking strategy exists if and only if there is one service fi
that has access to all variables except the one private variable for each
other fj (fi itself may have more than one private variable), i.e., if there
is one node fi that “sees” all variables except for n−1 many private ones.
Corollary 4.7. Let τ be a layered protocol with levels L0, . . . , Ln with
some i such that for each f ∈ Li, there is a variable xf ∈ Vars(f) \
Vars(Li\{f}) and there is no f ∈ Li with Vars(f) ⊇ Vars(Li)\
{
xf ′ | f
′ ∈ Li
}
.
Then τ is secure.
Both of these results follow easily by embedding a flat protocol satis-
fying the prerequisites of Theorem 4.2 or 4.3 into τ .
5 Generalized Security
In many situations, our security definition is too weak. In an internet
shopping protocol, we want the adversary to be unable to link the user’s
address and the product, but probably do not care about whether she can
link these values to the bit indicating express delivery. Yet, our definition
deems a protocol secure as soon as the latter bit cannot be linked to the
former values. Similarly, one might be tempted to apply Theorem 4.5 to
make a protocol τ secure by embedding into it a known secure protocol
τ ′, applied to dummy variables. Clearly, this does not give any meaningful
security for τ , as linking the dummy variables is irrelevant.
This illustrates that often, we consider a protocol τ insecure as soon as
the adversary can link a subset of “relevant” variables Xr ⊆ Vars(τ). We
call such a protocol Xr-insecure, and Xr-secure otherwise. This condition
is clearly stronger than security in the sense of Definition 2.2, since every
Xr-secure protocol trivially is secure. Our results can be directly applied
to Xr-security via the following straightforward relationship:
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Proposition 5.1. Let τ be a protocol and let Xr ⊆ Vars(τ). Then τ is
Xr-secure if and only if τ
∣∣
Xr
is secure, where τ
∣∣
Xr
is obtained from τ by
removing all variables x ∈ Vars(τ) \Xr and their outgoing edges.
Similarly, there are natural generalizations of our security defintion
such as not simply tracking the first session in a global session, but waiting
for a session with “interesting” values for user variables (values of these
variables must be present at the node tinit in a tracking strategy), and
clearly an arbitrary number of sessions can be tracked consecutively by
“recycling” the session cookie after the successful linking of a session. Our
techniques can easily be applied to these situations as well.
6 Conclusion
We have initiated the study of active linking attacks on communication
protocols which exploit that the adversary has control over user data. We
introduced a model, formalized a security definition and gave a sound
criterion—tracking strategies—for insecurity of protocols. We also gave
sound criteria (via embedding) for security of protocols. For a large class
of protocols, these criteria are complete, i.e., they detect all insecure pro-
tocols. The question whether this completeness holds in general remains
open.
Further interesting questions for future research concern relaxing the
“worst-case” assumptions underlying our approach:
We allow the adversary to ignore the intended semantics of the web-
services under her control, and to choose arbitrary query replies for a
linking attack. Realistically, the adversary will try to honestly answer a
majority of the queries in order to avoid detection. Further, we require
the adversary to be successful for every possible schedule. Realistically,
while interleaving certainly happens (and can be enforced to some extent
by a privacy-aware user), an adversary strategy that is only successful
against schedules with a limited amount of interleaving might be enough
to consider a protocol insecure.
Other extensions include randomized adversary strategies, which only
have to be successful with a certain probability, and scenarios where where
only a subset of the web services is controlled by the adversary.
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A Proof of Theorem 3.2
Theorem 3.2. Let τ be a protocol such that there exists a tracking strat-
egy for τ . Then τ is insecure.
Proof. We sketch how to construct a strategy Π which does tracking
for nodes in T and uses the other nodes to transmit bits through the
protocol unmodified. Without loss of generality we assume that T is  -
closed, i.e. it contains all nodes reachable from tinit. For every variable
node x we fix a path px as mentioned in the cover condition of definition
3.1. The adversary can construct a function p : τ \ (Vars(τ) ∪ {tinit})→
τ ∪ {⊥} with the following properties: For u ∈ T let p(u) = v with
v → u and v ∈ T , for u 6∈ T let p(u) be the predecessor of u if for
some variable node x there is a path px which ends in u, and let p(u) = ⊥
otherwise. This function expresses whether a node will echo back one of its
inputs as a reply, and if so, which one. Note that (T \ {tinit}) ⊆ dom(p);
this is no contradiction, since for a node u ∈ T , u 6= tinit projection
to the input parameter supplying the earlier generated tracking cookie
is indistinguishable from generating an “own” tracking cookie - there’s
effectively only one cookie generated by tinit and then passed on.
Now let β be an adversary view. First we assume the first local session
to address tinit still has pending unanswered queries. Let (u, I,⊥,⊥) be
the earliest unanswered query in β. If u = tinit we set Π(β) = reply(k, r),
where k is the index of that query and r = 0 if there’s no query to tinit
in the prefix of β up to (u, I,⊥,⊥) and r = 1 otherwise. This models
the tracking behavior of tinit with inconsistent replies. In the case of
u 6= tinit, we make a further distinction: If p(u) = ⊥ the node u isn’t vital
to the strategy and we just set Π(β) = reply(k, 1); if we have p(u) 6= ⊥
however, we set Π(β) = reply(k, I(p(u))), each with an appropriate choice
of k as above. Note that the symbol I in the latter case is the partial
assignment from the view. Now assume the first local session to ask tinit
has been served completely. In this case, we set Π(β) = print(Iout) with
Iout extracted from β as follows: Let (u, I, r, t) an element of β with u ∈ T ,
r = 0 and there is a variable node x such that px ends in u. Then let
Iout(x) = I(x).
It remains to show that Π is successful. Since the session to ask tinit
first will at some point be complete, a view will finally be attained which
makes Π emit a print action. Π will then produce the output Iout. We
now show that for a given global session (S, σ) we have Iout ∈ S. Assume
S = {I1, . . . , IN} and let It0 be the session which asks tinit first, i.e. the
session the adversary wants to track.
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Fact 1 If u ∈ T then Ii(u) = 0 if and only if i = t0.
Proof. Assume there is a query which violates this property. Let (i, t)
with t ∈ T be the earliest such query. Then clearly t 6= tinit by the
construction of Π. We have p(t) = v, where v ∈ T and v → t by definition
of p. Therefore the node v has already been asked and since (i, t) is the
earliest counterexample, we get Ii(v) = 0 if and only if i = t0, i.e. the
statement holds for v. Because of v → t we also get Ii(v) = Ii(t), i.e.
v’s reply is an input to t, and this yields Ii(t) = 0 if and only if i = t0,
contradicting our assumption. Therefore no query can violate the stated
property. ⊓⊔
With the above Fact we can justify calling tinit a synchronizer. It states
that, given a tracking strategy T , all nodes in T really know the unique
session to be tracked. With the next Fact we show that the adversary can
correctly channel variable contents to a tracking node.
Fact 2 For a variable node x, let px be of the form x  u  t, where
x ∈ Vars(τ), u 6∈ T and t ∈ T . Then Ii(x) = Ii(u) when local session Ii
has asked node u.
Proof. Assume Ii(x) 6= Ii(u) and let v be the first node in the path with
Ii(x) 6= Ii(v). By definition of function p we get p(v) = w for a node w
with w → v. Since w is a predecessor of v, we have Ii(x) = Ii(w). Now
consider a view in which v is the next node to be asked by Ii; accord-
ing to the definition of Π, the adversary will emit reply(k, Ii(p(v))) =
reply(k, Ii(w)) = reply(k, Ii(x)) for some k. We must have Ii(x) = Ii(v)
prior to asking u, which contradicts our assumption. Therefore no such v
can exist. ⊓⊔
We combine both Facts to obtain the result that tracking nodes get to
know the input values of session It0 .
Fact 3 For a variable node x, let px be of the form x  u → t, where
x ∈ Vars(τ), u 6∈ T , t ∈ T and t replies with a zero when asked. Then
Ii(u) = It0(x), i.e. u will supply t with a value from the session to be
tracked.
Proof. Since t ∈ T and Ii(t) = 0 after t has been asked, we can apply
Fact 1 which shows that i = t0 must hold. Using Fact 2 we can see that
It0(x) = It0(u) = Ii(u). ⊓⊔
We can now prove that Π is indeed a successful strategy. Let β be a view
in which session It0 has been completed. Then Π(β) = print(Iout) and by
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construction of Π we see that Iout is the union of all I such that (u, I, r, t)
is an element in this view with u ∈ T , r = 0 and there is a variable node
x such that px ends in u. Using Fact 3 we see that Iout ⊆ It0 . Since we
have a path px for every variable node x, we know that Iout contains an
assignment for every input value. Therefore Iout = It0 ∈ S.
⊓⊔
B Finding Tracking Strategies in Polynomial Time
We now prove that determining whether there exists a tracking strategy
for a given protocol τ can be done in polynomial time.
Problem: ∃-TStrat
Input: Protocol τ
Question: Is there a tracking strategy for τ?
Theorem B.1. The problem ∃-TStrat can be solved in polynomial time.
Proof. Clearly, a tracking strategy exists if and only if there is some
note tinit ∈ τ such that for the set Ttinit = {u ∈ τ | tinit  u}, the cover
condition is satisfied. We test this property for each non-variable node
tinit with a standard application of network flow. For this, we modify τ
to obtain a network-flow instance as follows:
– Contract all nodes T into a single node t, i.e., introduce a new node
t, then for each edge (u, v) with u /∈ T and v ∈ T , add an edge (u, t),
and finally remove all nodes in T .
– Introduce a node X and edges X → x with capacity 1 for each x ∈
Vars(τ).
– For each node u ∈ τ , introduce two new nodes uin and uout. Replace
all incoming edges (v, u) with an edge (v, uin) (with capacity 1), and
all outgoing edges (u, v) with an edge (uout, v) (also with capacity 1).
Add an edge (uin, uout) with capacity 1.
Then the cover property is satisfied if and only if there is a network
flow from X to T with value |Vars(τ)|:
– Assume that there is a network flow of value |Vars(τ)|. Then the
flow uses each outgoing edge of X, since there are |Vars(τ)| many of
these, and each has capacity 1. Since each internal edge (uin, uout) has
capacity 1, it can be used only once in the network flow. Therefore,
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the flow must consist of |Vars(τ)| node-disjoint paths to t, which can
be translated into node-disjoint paths into the set T . Hence the cover
condition is satisfied.
– For the converse, assume that the cover condition is satisfied. Then
there are node-disjoint paths from each x ∈ Vars(τ) to a node in
T , which correspond to node-disjoint paths from each x to t in the
modified protocol. By extending these paths with edges (X,x), they
clearly form a network flow from X to T of value |Vars(τ)|.
⊓⊔
C Security Proofs for Flat Protocols
In this section we present the proof of the theorems from Section 4.1.
First, we give a simple criterion for the existence of tracking strategies
for flat protocols.
Proposition C.1. Let τ = g(f1(
−→x1), . . . , fn(
−→xn)) be a flat protocol. Then
a tracking strategy for τ exists if and only if there is a function t : {1, . . . , n} →
Varsτ such that
– ∪ni=1t(i) = Varsτ ,
– there is at most one i with |t(i)| ≥ 2.
In particular, if such a function exists, then τ is insecure.
For a flat protocol, we also call a function t as above a flat tracking
strategy. For flat protocols, flat tracking strategies and tracking strategies
directly correspond to each other with tinit = fi, where i is the unique
number with |t(i)| ≥ 2 if such an i exists, and i = 1 otherwise. This,
together with an application of Theorem 3.2 proves Proposition C.1.
C.1 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Theorem 4.2. Let τ be a protocol of the form τ = g(f1(
−→x1), . . . , fn(
−→xn)),
such that {1, . . . , n} = I1 ∪ I2 with
– if i ∈ I1 and j ∈ I2, then
−→xi ∩
−→xj = ∅,
–
∣∣∪i∈Ij−→xi∣∣ > |Ij | ≥ 1 for j ∈ {1, 2}.
Then τ is secure.
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Proof. The main idea of the proof is as follows: To show that every
adversary-strategy Π fails, we construct, depending on Π, a global ses-
sion (S, σ) and then for each local session s ∈ S, a global session (Ss, σs)
such that the adversary-view for both sessions is identical, but s /∈ Ss.
If Π fails on (S, σ), then Π is not a winning strategy. If Π succeeds on
(S, σ), then Π prints a correct local session s ∈ S. Since the global session
(Ss, σs) is indistinguishable from (S, σ) for the adversary, the strategy Π
prints the same session s for the global session (Ss, σs). Since s /∈ Ss,
the strategy Π thus fails on (Ss, σs), and we have shown that Π is not a
winning strategy.
Hence let Π be an adversary strategy. Without loss of generality, we
assume that |Vars(I1)| ≥ |Vars(I2)|, and thus |Vars(I1)| = |Vars(I2)|+ d
for some d ≥ 0. We fix some terminology for our construction:
– For j ∈ {1, 2}, an Ij-assignment is a function a : Vars(Ij) → {0, 1}.
Note that a local session for the protocol τ is a union of an I1-
assignment and an I2-assignment, and, since Vars(I1)∩Vars(I2) = ∅,
any such union is a local session.
– For a local session s and j ∈ {1, 2}, the Ij-component of s is the
restriction of s to Vars(Ij).
In the proof, we only consider global sessions with the following prop-
erties:
– there are exactly 2|Vars(I1)| local sessions,
– for each I1-assignment a, there is exactly one local session s such that
the I1-component of s is a,
– for each I2-assignment a, there are exactly 2
d local sessions s such
that the I2-component of s is a,
– the schedule first performs all queries to f1, then all questions to f2,
etc, the g-questions are scheduled last. For each service, the questions
are scheduled in lexicographical order of the arguments.
In particular, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the fi-queries are all possible
assignments to the variables in −→xi , asked in lexographical order, each
assignment possibly several times. Let A1 be the set of I1-assignments,
and let A2 be the set containing 2
d distinct copies of each I2-assignment
(hence |A1| = |A2| = 2
|Vars(I1)|). All global sessions satisfying the above
generate the same adversary-view until the first g-query is performed. In
particular, the strategy Π will return the same answers to the fi-questions
for all global sessions with the above structure. Since adding edges to an
insecure protocol leaves the protocol insecure, we can assume that for
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i ∈ Ij , the input variables to fi in τ is the entire set Vars(Ij). Hence we
use the following notation: For an element a ∈ Aj and i ∈ Ij, with fi(a),
we denote the values returned by the adversary for the fi-question when
asked for the assignment a, and stress that these values are identical for
all global sessions following the above pattern.
For j ∈ {1, 2}, we say that elements a1, a2 ∈ Aj are j-equivalent and
write a1 ∼j a2 if fi(a1) = fi(a2) for all i ∈ Ij. We note that the adversary
can give different replies to different copies of the same I2-assignment,
i.e., even if a1 and a2 are copies of the the same I2-assignment, then
fi(a1) 6= fi(a2) may still hold for i ∈ I2, and hence for these elements we
may have a1 6∼2 a2. This issue does not occur for elements of A1, since
A1 contains only one copy of each I1-assignment.
Since each ∼j-equivalence class is determined by the values of the
functions fi for i ∈ Ij , there are at most 2
|Ij | ∼j-equivalence classes. Our
construction relies on the existence of a sufficient number of elements
a ∈ Aj , for both j ∈ {1, 2}, such that there is an element a
′ ∈ Aj with
a ∼j a
′, and a′ is a copy of a different Ij-assignment than a. We call
such an element j-ambigious, since the Ij-assignment represented by a
is not uniquely determined by its ∼j-equivalence class. These elements
are helpful for the following reason: When the adversary receives a ques-
tion for the service g from a given local session, this question contains
the answers given by the adversary for all fi-question of the same lo-
cal session, and hence the adversary “sees” the ∼j-equivalence class of
both Ij-components of this local session. If one of these components is
j-ambigious, the adversary cannot determine the Ij-component directly
from the inputs to g, and hence cannot directly reconstruct the local
session from the inputs received for the g-question.
We now show that there are “enough” ambigious elements for our
purposes:
Fact 1 For each j ∈ {1, 2}, more than half of the elements in Aj are
j-ambigious.
Proof. This follows with a simple counting argument. To treat the cases
j = 0 and j = 1 uniformly, let d0 = 0 and d1 = d. Since the number of
∼j-equivalence classes is 2
|Ij |, and each Ij-assignment occurs 2
dj times in
Aj , there can be at most 2
|Ij | · 2dj = 2|Ij |+dj non-j-ambigious elements.
In particular, some elements are j-ambigious, and thus there is at least
one ∼j-equivalence class containing elements that represent different Ij-
assignments. Therefore, there can be at most 2|Ij | − 1 equivalence classes
containing non-j-ambigious elements, and therefore there are at most
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(2|Ij | − 1) · 2dj ≤ 2|Ij |+dj − 1 non-j-ambigious elements. Since |Aj | =
2|Vars(Ij)|+dj and |Vars(Ij)| = |Ij | + e for some e > 0, it follows that
|Aj | = 2
|Ij |+dj+e, hence less than half of the elements of Aj are non-j-
ambigious as claimed. ⊓⊔
We now construct the global session (S, σ). SinceVars(I1)∩Vars(I2) =
∅, a global session matching the above criteria is uniquely determined by
a bijection between A1 and A2, and two such global sessions result in the
same view for the adversary if and only if the same questions are asked
for the service g. We represent the bijection as a table with 2|Vars(I1)| rows
and two columns, where the first column contains elements from A1, and
the second column contains elements from A2. The bijection determining
the global session then relates the elements that occur in the same row.
The set S of local sessions can simply be read off the rows of the table
in the natural way. We therefore identify local sessions s ∈ S and rows
in the table. The g-queries resulting from the session represented in the
table can also be read off the table: For a local session s consisting of the
elements a1 ∈ A1 and a2 ∈ A2, the input to the g-query from that session
is the tuple (f1(a1), . . . , fk(a1), fk+1(a2), . . . , fn(a2)), if I1 = {1, . . . , k}
and I2 = {k + 1, . . . , n}.
For the global session (S, σ), the elements of A1 and A2 are now
distributed in the table as follows:
– In the first column, we first list all elements of A1 that are 1-ambigious,
ordered by equivalence class, and then all elements that are not 1-
ambigious. Due to Fact 1, more than half of the rows contain 1-
ambigious elements in their first column.
– We distribute the A2-elements in the second column such that the
rows in the lower half and the last row of the upper half of the ta-
ble contain only 2-ambigious elements in their second column. This
is possible since due to Fact 1, a majority of the elements in A2 are
2-ambigious. We re-order the elements in the upper half of the table
such that no row in the upper half has a neighboring row with an
element representing the same I2-assignment. This is possible since
|Vars(I2)| > |I2| ≥ 1, and thus there are at least 4 different I2-
assignments, and hence no I2-assignment can occur in more than half
of the rows in the upper half of the table.
By construction, the ambigious elements make up at least half of each
column. Hence each row in the table contains an 1-ambigious element in
the first column (this is true at least for the upper half of the rows), or
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a 2-ambigious element in the second column (this is true at least for the
lower half of the table).
We now construct, for each s ∈ S, the session (Ss, σs). For this it
suffices to define the set Ss, the schedule σs is then determined by the
above criteria. The set Ss is obtained from the above table-representation
of S as follows:
– If the row s has a 2-ambigious A2-element a in the second column, we
swap the positions of a and an element a′ that represents a different
I2-assignment than a, and for which a
′ ∼Π,2 a holds. Such an element
exists since a is 2-ambigious. Clearly, the I1-component of s is paired
with a different I2-component after the swap, and hence the local
session s is removed from S.
– Otherwise, s appears in the upper half of the table, and is not the last
row in the upper half of the table. In particular, s has a 1-ambigious
A1-element a in the first column. Since the A1-elements appear or-
dered by equivalence class, one of the rows directly above or below s
contains an element a′ 6= a with a′ ∼1 a in the first column. Since s
is not the last row of the upper half of the table, a′ also appears in
the upper half of the table. We now swap a and a′ in the first column.
By distribution of the A2-elements in the upper half of the second
column, the two rows involved in the exchange contain elements cor-
responding to different I2-assignments, and since each I1-assignment
appears only once in A1, we also know that a and a
′ represent dif-
ferent I1-assignments. Therefore, as above, the I1-component of s is
paired with a different I2-component after the swap, and hence again,
the local session s is removed from S.
In both cases, we removed one occurrence of the local session s from
S. Since each I1-component appears only once in S, the local session s
also appears only once in s, and hence we removed the only appearance of
s from S. Therefore, the new global session (Ss, σs) does not contain any
local session s anymore. Since the session (Ss, σs) is obtained from (S, σ)
by exchanging some element from Aj with an ∼j-equivalent element, each
row in the table generates the same questions to the g-service as the
session (S, σ), and therefore, the set of g-queries in the global session
(Ss, σs) is the same as in the session (S, σ). Since the individual queries
are performed in lexicographical order, the adversary-view of (S, σ) and
(Ss, σs) is identical, which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
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C.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3
In this section, we show that a flat protocol τ = g(f1(x
1
1, . . . , x
1
m1), f2(x
2
1, . . . , x
2
m2),
. . . , fn(x
n
1 , . . . , x
n
mn)) where every fi has at least one private variable is
insecure if and only if there is a tracking strategy for τ . We know that
tracking strategies always imply insecurity of the protocol, hence the in-
teresting part of the result is to show that in the absence of a tracking
strategy, the protocol is secure. For our proof, we introduce some nota-
tion: For each fi, let Xi be the set of private variables for fi. Clearly,
Xi ∩ Xj = ∅ if i 6= j. Let V be the set of non-private variables, i.e.,
V = Vars(τ) \ ∪ni=1Xi.
We first cover a number of “simple” cases:
Lemma C.2. Let τ be a flat protocol for which no tracking strategy exists
and which satisfies one of the following conditions:
1. There is some i with |Xi| ≥ 2,
2. there is an i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with V ⊆ Vars(fi),
3. |V | ≤ 2.
Then τ is secure.
Proof. Without loss of generality assume that |X1| ≥ |X2| ≥ · · · ≥ |Xn| ≥
1. We first consider the case |X2| ≥ 2. In this case, we also have |X1| ≥
2. Clearly, no tracking strategy can exist. To show that the protocol is
secure, assume indirectly that it is insecure. We drop all variables from
V , the resulting protocol τ ′ is still insecure. (This can easily be seen as a
consequence of Theorem 4.5, or simply by observing that the adversary
can simulate all “missing” variables by using 0-values). However, we can
choose I1 = {1} and I2 = {2, . . . , n}, then security of the protocol follows
from Theorem 4.2, since (using the notation of the theorem), Vars(I1) =
X1 and Vars(I2) = X2∪· · ·∪Xn, with |Vars(I1)| ≥ 2, and |Vars(I2)| ≥ n.
Therefore, for the remainder of the proof we assume that |X2| = · · · =
|Xn| = 1.
Next, we consider the case V ⊆ Vars(f1). In this case, a flat tracking
strategy exists with t(1) = X1 ∪ V and t(i
′) = Xi′ for all i
′ 6= i. The
theorem thus follows with Proposition C.1. From now on, we assume that
V 6⊆ Vars(f1), in particular, this implies V 6= ∅.
We now prove the lemma:
1. In this case, it follows that |X1| ≥ 2. Due to the above, we can assume
that there is a variable v ∈ V \ Vars(f1). We use Theorem 4.2 to
prove security of τ , with I1 = {1} and I2 = {2, . . . , n}. We have
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that Vars(I1) ⊇ X1 and thus |Vars(I1)| > |I1| = 1, and Vars(I2) ⊇
{v} ∪ ∪ni=2Xi, hence |Vars(I2)| ≥ n > n− 1 = |I2|.
2. Due to point 1, we can assume that |Xi| = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. If there is
an i ∈ {1, . . . , n} with V ⊆ Vars(fi), then there is a tracking strategy
t for τ , defined as t(i) = Xi ∪ V and t(i
′) = Xi′ for i
′ 6= i, but from
the prerequisites we know that there is no tracking strategy for τ .
3. Due to the above, we can assume that V ≥ 2, since otherwise there will
be some i with V ⊆ Vars(fi). Thus assume that |V | = 2, and let V =
{v1, v2}. Again due to point 2, we know that there is no i with v1, v2 ∈
Vars(fi). We show that the protocol is secure using Theorem 4.2. To
apply the theorem, we define I1 = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} | v1 ∈ Vars(fi)},
and I2 = {1, . . . , n}\I1. Note that v2 ∈ Vars(I2), and henceVars(Ij) =
∪i∈IjXi∪{vj} for both j ∈ {1, 2}. In particular, |Vars(Ij)| > |Ij| holds
for both j. Security of the protocol thus follows from Theorem 4.2.
⊓⊔
By Lemma C.2, we can in particular assume that for each fi, there
is a single private variable. For protocols of this form, there is a trivial
characterization of the cases in which a tracking strategy exists:
Lemma C.3. If τ is a protocol where each fi has exactly one private
variable, then there is a tracking strategy for τ if and only if there is
some i with V ⊆ Vars(fi).
Proof. This easily follows from Proposition C.1: If an i satisfying the
condition exists, a flat tracking strategy t is given by t(i) = Vars(fi), and
t(i′) = Xi′ for all i
′ 6= i. On the other hand, assume that a flat tracking
strategy t exists. Since each Xi contains exactly one private variable for
fi, we know that Xi ⊆ t(i) for all i. Since there is at most one i with
|t(i)| > 1, for this i we must have V ⊆ Vars(fi). If there is no such i, then
V = ∅ ⊆ Vars(fi). ⊓⊔
In the security proof, it will be convenient to make some assumptions
about the structure of the protocol τ . We call protocols meeting these
assumptions a protocol in normal form. The main part of the proof is
showing that protocols in normal form for which no tracking strategy
exists are secure, from this we will later easily deduce that the result also
holds for all flat protocols where each service-node has a private variable.
Definition C.4. A flat protocol τ where each fi has a single private vari-
able is in normal form, if the following conditions are satisfied:
28 Henning Schnoor and Oliver Woizekowski
– For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have that Vars(fi) = Xi ∪ (V \ vi) for
some vi ∈ V ,
– for each v ∈ V , there is some i with v /∈ Vars(fi),
– |V | ≥ 3.
In particular, in this case we have |Vars(fi)| = |V | for all i and n ≥ |V |.
The main ingredient of the proof of our classification is the result that
the classification holds for protocols in normal form:
Theorem C.5. Let τ be a flat protocol where each fi has a private vari-
able and which is in normal form. Then τ is insecure if and only if a
tracking strategy for τ exists.
Proof. Due to Theorem 3.2, we know that if there is a tracking strategy
for τ , then τ is indeed insecure. Hence assume that there is no tracking
strategy for τ , and indirectly assume that τ is insecure. Let Π be a corre-
sponding successful adversary strategy. We introduce some notation for
the proof:
– Since τ is in normal form, we know that for each i, |Xi| = 1, i.e., there
is a single private variable for fi. We denote this variable with xi.
– In this proof, the index i always ranges over the set {1, . . . , n}.
– A V -assignment is a function g : V → {0, 1}. Such an assignment is
even, if ⊕y∈V v(y) = 0 and odd, if ⊕y∈V v(y) = 1.
– For any i, a Vi-assignment is a function g : V ∩Vars(fi)→ {0, 1}, i.e.,
a truth assignment to the non-private variables visible for fi.
– We assume that V = {y1, . . . , ym} for some m ≥ 3.
– We say that a local session s is based on a V -assignment g (Vi-
assignment g) if s(yk) = g(yk) for all yk ∈ V (for all yk ∈ Vars(fi)∩V ).
The local session s is even (odd) if it is based on an even (odd) as-
signment.
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 4.2, in the remainder of this proof we
will only consider global sessions (S, σ) satisfying the following conditions:
1. There are exactly 2|V | local sessions, all of which are different assign-
ments to the variables in Vars(τ),
2. the set of queries at each fi is the set of all possible assignments
g : Vars(fi)→ {0, 1},
3. the schedule first performs all queries to f1, then all questions to f2,
etc, the g-questions are scheduled last. For each service, the queries
are scheduled in lexicographical order of the arguments.
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We call a global session satisfying the above a normal global ses-
sion. We will explicitly construct normal global sessions below. All nor-
mal global sessions look the same until the first g-query is performed.
Therefore, similarly as in the proof for Theorem 4.2, Π gives the same
answer to each fi question in every normal global session. Since every
fi-question appears exactly once in each normal global session, Π there-
fore is characterized by Boolean functions representing the answers to the
fi-questions and the output action performed at the end of the protocol
run. (Clearly, the answers to the g-queries are not relevant.) We simply
call these functions f1, . . . , fn, and for a local session s of a normal global
session simply write fi(s) for fi(s
∣∣
Vars(fi)
). In the following, we identify
a normal global session S with the set of local sessions appearing in S,
since the schedule is uniquely determined by this set and the conditions
for normal global sessions. The adversary’s view of a normal global ses-
sion S is completely determined by the set of g-queries performed in this
session, i.e., the set of tuples {(f1(s), f2(s), . . . , fn(s)) | s ∈ S}.
We now construct a global session Seven as follows: For each even V -
assignment g, there are two local sessions sg1 and s
g
2 in Seven that are based
on g. For each i, we have sg1(xi) = s
g
2(xi). We only fix this relationship
now, and will fix the concrete values for the private variables later, de-
pending on the adversary strategy Π. The global session Sodd is defined
analogously, using the odd V -assignments.
Fact 1 Seven and Sodd are normal global sessions.
Proof. By construction we have exactly 2|V | local sessions, which repre-
sent pairwise different assignments to the variables. It remains to show
that for each fi and each assignment g : Vars(fi) → {0, 1}, there is ex-
actly one local session s ∈ Seven with s
∣∣
Vars(fi)
= g. Since |Vars(fi)| =
|V |, it suffices to show that each two local sessions s 6= s′ ∈ S dif-
fer for at least one variable in Vars(fi). Hence assume indirectly that
s
∣∣
Vars(fi)
= s′
∣∣
Vars(fi)
. In particular, s(xi) = x
′(xi). By construction of
Seven, s and s
′ are based on different V -assignments. Since s and s′ agree
on all yk ∈ V ∩ Vars(fi), there is a unique yk ∈ V with s(yk) 6= s
′(yk).
Hence s and s′ cannot both be even. This is a contradiction, since Seven
contains only local sessions based on even assignments. The proof for Sodd
is analogous. ⊓⊔
For the variable xi, the function fi is the only function that “sees” the
value of xi in a local session. Therefore, fi has to “report” any information
about the value of xi that the adversary wants to use. In particular, we are
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interested in Vi-assignments g for which the value of fi differs depending
on whether g is extended by assigning 0 or 1 to xi. These assignments are
those where fi “tries to” keep track of the value of the variable xi. We
make this notion formal:
Notation. A V -assignment g is i-flipping if fi(s) 6= fi(s
′), where s
∣∣
V
=
s′
∣∣
V
= g
∣∣
Vars(fi)
and s(xi) 6= s
′(xi). We say that g is all-flipping if g is
i-flipping for all i. A local session s is i-flipping (all-flipping) if s
∣∣
V
is
i-flipping (all-flipping).
Whether a V -assignment g is i-flipping only depends on v
∣∣
Vars(fi)
.
We therefore also apply the notion i-flipping to Vi-assignments with the
obvious meaning.
Fact 2 1. Let s be the local session returned by Π when a normal global
session is run. Then s
∣∣
V
is all-flipping.
2. There are exactly two all-flipping V -assignments, one of which is even
and one of which is odd. We denote these with geven and godd.
Proof. 1. Assume that this is false for the normal global session S. Then
there is some i such that s is not i-flipping. Since S is a normal global
session, there is a session s′ ∈ S based on the same Vi-assignment
as s with s′(xi) = s(xi). Since s is not i-flipping, we have that
fi(s) = fi(s
′). Let S′ be the global session obtained from S by re-
versing the truth value of xi in both s and s
′. Since fi(s) = fi(s
′), the
value of fi remains unchanged for the sessions s and s
′. Clearly, the
result is a normal global session which does not contain the session s,
and which is indistinguishable from S for the adversary. Therefore, Π
again returns the session s, and thus fails on S′, a contradiction.
2. Existence of the assignments directly follows from the above since Π
is a successful strategy and thus returns a correct session on both
Seven and Sodd. It remains to show that there is only one all-flipping
V -assignment of each parity.
We only cover the even case, the odd case is symmetric. Recall that
Seven contains two sessions for every even V -assignment. Assume that
there are k even all-flipping assignments g1, . . . , gk with k ≥ 2. We
choose the values of the variables xi in the Seven such that for the two
local sessions s11 and s
1
2 based on g1, we get the g-queries (0, 1, 1, . . . , 1)
and (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0), and for l ∈ {2, . . . , k}, for the two local sessions sl1
and sl2 based on gl, we get the g-queries (1, 1, 1, . . . , 1) and (0, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
This is possible since g1, . . . , gk are all-flipping.
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Since Π is successful, Π returns a local session s ∈ Seven when the
global session Seven is run. Due to the first part, s is all-flipping, and
hence s is based either on g1 or on some gl with l ≥ 2. We construct a
session S′even which contains none of the sessions from Seven based on
g1 or gl. We do this by reversing the values of x1 in these four local
sessions. Clearly, the original four sessions are not contained in S′even.
The g-queries from the affected sessions are as follows:
– For the two local sessions based on g1, we get the queries (1, 1, 1, . . . , 1)
and (0, 0, 0, . . . , 0),
– For the two local sesisons based on gl, we get the queries (0, 1, 1, . . . , 1)
and (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0).
Hence the set of g-queries resulting from Seven and S
′
even is identical.
Since S′even is obtained from S0 by swapping the values of xi for the
same V -assignment, S′even is again a normal global session. Therefore,
Seven and S
′
even are indistinguishable to the adversary, and hence Π
returns the same local sessions s when S′even is run. Since this session
is not present in S′even, we have a contradiction.
⊓⊔
In the remainder of the proof, we only consider global sessions that
satisfy the following criteria:
– For each V -assignment g : V → {0, 1}, there is exactly one local ses-
sion s based on g.
– Due to the above, for each i and each Vi-assignment g, there are two
local sessions si,g0 and s
i,g
1 based on g. For these two sessions, we have
that si,g0 (xi) = s
i,g
1 (xi).
– The schedule follows the conditions for normal global sessions.
We call such global sessions complete normal sessions, since every
V -assignment appears, and it is easy to see that every such sessions is
normal. For each i and each Vi-assignment g, the local sessions s
i,g
0 and
si,g1 assign different values to the single variable vi ∈ V \ Vars(fi), and
they also assign different values to the variable xi. Therefore, either both
of these sessions assign the same value to xi and vi, or both of them assign
different values to these variables.
Notation. Let g be a Vi-assignment. As argued above, one of the two
following cases occurs:
– Either si,g0 (xi) = s
i,g
0 (vi) and s
i,g
1 (xi) = s
i,g
1 (vi), in this case we say
that xi has positive polarity in g,
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– or si,g0 (xi) = s
i,g
0 (vi) and s
i,g
1 (xi) = s
i,g
1 (vi), in this case we say that xi
has negative polarity in g.
We also say that xi has positive (negative) polarity in a V -assignment
g, if xi has positive (negative) polarity in g ∩ Vars(fi).
In the remainder of the proof, we will carefully change the polarities of
variables for appropiate assignments to construct global sessions which are
indistinguishable for the adversary, but do not contain the session that Π
reports. Hence we summarize the effect of reversing polarity of a variable
in the following fact, which follows immediately from the definition of
i-flipping: Reversing the polarity of xi for the V -assignment v flips the
value of fi(s) for both local sessions s based on v.
Fact 3 Let J ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, let s be a local session based on the V -
assignment g, and let s′ be the local session obtained from s by changing
the polarities of all xj in g
∣∣
Vars(fi)∩V
with j ∈ J . Then
fi(s
′) = fi(s)⊕
{
1, if i ∈ J and g is i-flipping,
0, otherwise.
Recall that due to Fact 2, there is exactly one all-flipping V -assignment
of each parity, namely geven and godd. Clearly, geven 6= godd, since their
parity differs. Without loss of generality, we assume geven(ym) 6= godd(ym).
We now make a case distinction, depending on whether there is another
variable yk ∈ V \{ym} for which these assignments differ. These cases are
significantly different, since if such a variable does not exist, then there
are values i (namely those for which ym /∈ Vars(fi)) for which geven and
godd agree on all variables in V ∩Vars(fi), and hence from the input val-
ues for this i, sessions based on geven and on godd cannot be distinguished.
This makes the construction somewhat easier. This is not the case if geven
and godd differ for more than one variable in V .
Case 1: godd(yk) = geven(yk) for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}. Then geven and
godd differ only in the value of ym. In particular, the two local sessions seven
and sodd based on geven and godd agree on all yk for k ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}.
Due to Fact 3, we can choose the polarities of the variables xi such that
in the resulting global session S, we have the following:
– fi(seven) = 0 for all i,
– in the local session sodd:
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• for all i with ym ∈ Vars(fi), let fi(sodd) = 0. This can be cho-
sen independently from the above since geven and godd differ in a
variable from Vars(fi) ∩ V ,
• for the remaining i with ym /∈ Vars(fi), we necessarily have fi(sodd) =
1 since for these i, geven and godd agree for the variables in Vars(fi)∩
V , hence seven(xi) = sodd(xi). Since geven and godd are all-flipping,
this implies fi(sodd) = fi(seven) = 1.
Hence the local session seven results in the g-query (0, 0, . . . , 0), and
sodd yields the query ( 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i with ym /∈Vars(fi)
, 0, . . . , 0). The polarities for the
remaining sessions are irrelevant.
Since Π is successful, a local session s from S is returned when S is
run. Due to Fact 2, s is all-flipping, and hence s is based on geven or on
godd, i.e., s ∈ {seven, sodd}. We construct a complete normal session S
′
that is indistinguishable from S for the adversary, and which does not
contain s.
We construct S′ by reversing, in the assignment geven, the polarity of
all xi with ym /∈ Vars(fi). For such i, geven and godd agree on all variables
in Vars(fi) ∩ V . Therefore, S
′ contains neither seven nor sodd, and hence
does not contain s. We now show that S′ and S are indistinguishable for
the adversary, i.e., that they result in the same g-queries.
Clearly, only the g-queries resulting from the local sessions based on
veven and vodd can differ between S and S
′, and for both sessions, due to
Fact 3, the values of the fi-functions in these local sessions are reversed
for all i with ym /∈ Vars(fi), since geven and godd are i-flipping for all
these i. Hence the local session in S′ based on geven results in the g-
query ( 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i with ym /∈Vars(fi)
, 0, . . . , 0), and the local session in S′ based on godd
now results in the g-query (0, 0, . . . , 0). The set of g-queries is therefore
unchanged, and hence S′ is indistinguishable from S for the adversary.
Therefore, the adversary returns s1 or s2, fails on S
′ as claimed.
Case 2: there is some k ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} with vodd(yk) = 1. In this case
geven and godd differ in at least one variable from Vars(fi) ∩ V for all
i. Hence for every i, we can set the polarities of xi in godd and in geven
independently.
We again construct a complete global session as above by choosing
appropiate polarities.
In the following, let pty be either even or odd.
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Let spty1 be the local session based on vpty, and let s
pty
2 be the local
session based on the assignment obtained from vpty by reversing the value
of ym (note that since geven and godd differ in more than one variable, this
assignment is different from both geven and godd, and in fact has a different
parity than pty).
We consider the g-queries resulting from spty1 and s
pty
2 . These are the
values fi(s
pty
1 ) and fi(s
pty
2 ) for all i. For all i, let α
pty
i = fi(s
pty
1 ), and let
βptyi = fi(s
pty
2 ). Since s
pty
1 is based on gpty which is all-flipping, we can
choose the polarities of the xi for gpty to achieve any value of αi. We fix
the polarities as follows:
– For i with ym /∈ Vars(fi), we have that s
pty
1 and s
pty
2 agree on all
variables in V ∩ Vars(fi). Hence s
pty
1 (xi) 6= s
pty
2 (xi) must hold for
such i. Since gpty is all-flipping, we have β
pty
i = α
pty
i for all such i.
– For i with ym ∈ Vars(fi), since s
pty
1 (ym) 6= s
pty
2 (ym), we can choose
the polarities of xi in s
pty
1 ∩V and in s
pty
2 ∩V independently. We choose
these polarities such that αptyi = β
pty
i .
The remaining polarities are chosen arbitrarily. Let S be the resulting
global session, and let s ∈ S be the session returned when S is run.
Due to Fact 2, s is based on an all-flipping V -assignment, therefore s ∈{
seven1 , s
odd
1
}
. Let S′ be the complete normal session obtained from S by
reversing the polarities of all xi with ym /∈ Vars(fi) in geven and in godd.
Clearly, both local sessions seven1 and s
odd
1 do not occur in S
′, and hence
s does not occur in S′. To show that S and S′ are indistinguishable for
the adversary, we show that the set of resulting g-queries is the same.
Obviously, only the g-queries resulting from the local sessions based on
the same V -assignments as the four sessions seven1 , s
even
2 , s
odd
1 and s
odd
2
are affected.
Due to Fact 3, for the local sessions based on spty1
∣∣∣
V
and spty2
∣∣∣
V
, the
g-queries resulting from these local sessions in S′ are obtained from the
values for the corresponding sessions in S, except that the values of the
fi with ym /∈ Vars(fi) are reversed.
Therefore, the g-queries resulting from the sessions based on the same
V -assignments as spty1 and spty2 are as follows:
Instead of
( αpty1 , . . . , α
pty
k ,︸ ︷︷ ︸
i with ym /∈Vars(fi)
, αptyk+1, . . . , α
pty
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
i with ym∈Vars(fi)
) and ( αpty1 , . . . , α
pty
k ,︸ ︷︷ ︸
i with ym /∈Vars(fi)
, βptyk+1, . . . , β
pty
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
i with ym∈Vars(fi)
),
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the resulting g-queries are now
( αpty1 , . . . , α
pty
k ,︸ ︷︷ ︸
i with ym /∈Vars(fi)
, αptyk+1, . . . , α
pty
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
i with ym∈Vars(fi)
) and ( αpty1 , . . . , α
pty
k ,︸ ︷︷ ︸
i with ym /∈Vars(fi)
, βptyk+1, . . . , β
pty
n︸ ︷︷ ︸
i with ym∈Vars(fi)
).
Since for all i with ym ∈ Vars(fi), we have that α
pty
i = β
pty
i , these are
the exact same sets of g-queries. Therefore, the two local sessions based
on the same V -assignments as spty1 and s
pty
2 lead to the same g-queries
in both S and S′. Since this is true for both parities, the set of g-queries
in S and in S′ is identical, and thus S and S′ are indistinguishable for
the adversary. It follows that Π returns the local session s when S′ is
performed. Since s /∈ S′, this shows that Π fails.
This completes the proof of Theorem C.5 ⊓⊔
Using Theorem C.5, Theorem 4.3 now follows rather easily:
Theorem 4.3. Let τ be a flat protocol where each fi has a private vari-
able. Then τ is insecure if and only if a tracking strategy for τ exists.
Proof. Due to Lemma C.2, we can assume that none of the conditions
stated in that lemma are satisfied, in particular, this means that each fi
has a single private variable xi. Since the existence of a tracking strategy
implies insecurity due to Theorem 3.2, we assume that there is no track-
ing strategy for τ and prove that the protocol is secure. To do this, we
indirectly assume that τ is insecure.
Due to Lemma C.2, we can assume that there is no i with V ⊆
Vars(fi). Therefore, each Vars(fi) contains at most |V |−1 of the variables
in V . By adding edges from variable nodes to the nodes fi, we can ensure
that each fi sees exactly |V | − 1 variables of V , since adding edges never
makes an insecure protocol secure, the thus-obtained τ is still insecure,
and due to Lemma C.3, there still is no tracking strategy for τ .
If after these additions, there is a variable v ∈ V such that v ∈
Vars(fi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then we remove this variable v from τ
and the protocol remains insecure (again, this follows from Theorem 4.5
but can also be seen directly), and there still is no tracking strategy for τ
due to Lemma C.3. Hence we can consecutively remove all variables v ap-
pearing in all Vars(fi). If for the thus-reduced protocol we have |V | ≤ 2,
the theorem follows from Lemma C.2. Otherwise, we have obtained a flat
protocol that is in normal form, insecure, but for which no tracking strat-
egy exists. This is a contradiction to Theorem C.5. ⊓⊔
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We therefore have seen that for flat protocols where every service-
node has a private variable, the simple tracking strategy explained in the
introduction is indeed the only successful adversary strategy in the sense
that if this strategy fails, then all other strategies fail as well.
D Proof of Embedding Theorem 4.5
In this section, we prove Theorem 4.5. We first discuss the insecurity-
preserving transformations required for the proof. In addition to cloning,
the following operations are used:
– Introducing a bypass for an edge u→ v means connecting every pre-
decessor of u directly with v and removing the edge u→ v.
– Removing a removable node means removing a node u that has no
outgoing edges and for which there is a node v 6= u such that each
predecessor of u is also a predecessor of v.
– Splitting an edge u → v means introducing a new node w, removing
the edge u→ v and introducing edges u→ w and w → v.
– Unsplitting an edge means reversing the splitting operation.
– Restricting to a closed sub-protocol means removing all nodes that are
not part of an induced subgraph satisfying natural closure properties.
Figures 10, 11, and 12 visualize the effect of the bypass and cloning
transformation: Figure 10 contains an excerpt of a protocol. Figure 11
shows the effect of bypassing the edge u → v, and Figure 12 shows the
effect of cloning the node v. Splitting is visualized in Figures 13 and 14;
the former contains an excerpt of a protocol, the latter shows the effect of
splitting on this excerpt. It is easy to see that the splitting operation does
not affect the security of a protocol. The operation is interesting because
it allows us to re-write protocols into a layered form without affecting
security.
u
v
tn. . .t1
s1 . . . sm
. . .w1 wℓ
Fig. 10: Protocol
u
v
tn. . .t1
s1 . . . sm
. . .w1 wℓ
Fig. 11: Bypass
u
vv′
tn. . .t1
s1 . . . sm
. . .w1 wℓ
Fig. 12: Cloning
Active Linkability Attacks 37
We now give formal defintions of these treansformations and show
that each of them preserves insecurity of a protocol. We then use these
results to prove the theorem.
Definition D.1. Let τ be a protocol, and let u, v be non-variable nodes
in τ .
1. if u → v is an edge, then the u-v-bypass of τ is obtained by the
following operations:
– for each w such that (w, u) is an edge in τ , add an edge (w, v) to
τ ,
– remove the edge (u, v).
2. If u has no outgoing edges in τ , then u is removable, if there is a node
w 6= u such that all predecessors of u are also predecessors of w.
3. Let S be a subset of the successor nodes of v in τ . Then S-cloning v
results in a protocol obtained from τ as follows:
– introduce a new node v′,
– for all edges (w, v) in τ , introduce an edge (w, v′),
– for each s ∈ S, replace the edge (v, s) with (v′, s).
“Cloning” a variable node of an insecure protocol can result in a se-
cure one, as the adversary now is required to take more variables into
account. A simple example is the flat protocol g(f1(x, x), f2(x, x)), which
is clearly insecure, but by repeatedly cloning x, we obtain the protocol
g(f1(x, x
′), f2(x
′′, x′′′)), which is secure (see Example 4.1, which discusses
the same protocol with different variable names). Therefore, we only con-
sider cloning non-variable nodes.
Definition D.2. Let τ be a protocol, and let (u, v) be an edge in τ . Then
splitting (u, v) results in the following protocol:
– remove the edge (u, v),
– add a new node w,
– add edges (u,w) and (w, v).
u
v
. . .s1 sn
. . .t1 tm
Fig. 13: Protocol
u
v
w
. . .s1 sn
. . .t1 tm
Fig. 14: Splitting
Intuitively, splitting (u, v)
introduces an additional node in
the protocol that can be used by
the adversary to simply copy its
input.
We show that all of the
above-introduced operations pre-
serve insecurity of a protocol: If
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we apply one of the operations
to an insecure protcol, then the
resulting protocol is insecure as
well.
Lemma D.3. Let τ be an insecure protocol, and let τ ′ be obtained from
τ as
1. the result of cloning a node v, or
2. the u-v-bypass of τ for some nodes u and v of τ , or
3. the result of removing a single removable node and all of its incoming
edges from τ .
Then τ ′ is insecure as well.
Note that we cannot remove all removable nodes of a protocol in one
step, since there may be different nodes u and v with the same set of
predecessors, but we cannot remove both of them without rendering the
adversary’s strategy defect.
Proof. Note that in all three cases, the set of variables of τ is unchanged.
In particular, an assignment I is a local session for τ if and only if I is a
local session for τ ′. Hence, let S be a multiset of local sessions for τ (or,
equivalently, for τ ′).
1. Since τ is insecure, there is a successful strategy Π against τ . We
construct a strategy Π ′ against τ ′ that essentially simulates Π. The
strategy Π ′ proceeds as follows: During the run of the protocol, Π
keeps a list of entries of the form (i, Iv , r), where i ∈ N, Iv is an
assignment to the inputs to v, and r is a single bit. Such an entry states
that when Π was queried for the i-th time with the input values Iv at
the node v, the reply was i. (Recall that an adversary’s strategy may
be inconsistent in the sense that when replying to the same question
twice, it may produce different answers.) Additionally, Π ′ keeps track
of the queries made at the nodes v and v′.
– for each query at a node w /∈ {v, v′}: perform the query in a
simulation of the original protocol with strategy Π.
– for each query at a node w ∈ {v, v′}: Let Iv be the assignment to
the input values from the user question. Let the current query be
the i-th time that the value Iv was asked at the node w. Check
whether an entry (i, Iv , r) is present in the above-mentioned list.
If so, reply to the query with r. Otherwise, perform a query of the
node v in the simulated protocol τ with strategy Π, and let r be
the reply. Store the entry (i, Iv , r) and reply with r.
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Clearly, this results in a simulation of τ with strategy Π on a global
session with the same multiset of local sessions as the actually running
global session. Essentially, Π ′ simulates the caching of the value for v
that is done when τ is performed. Therefore, since Π is a successful
strategy, Π will eventually produce a local session. The strategy Π ′
simply returns the local session produced by Π and is successful.
2. We first modify τ so that v is the only successor of u in τ : We introduce
a clone u′ of u, and connect all successors of u that are different from v
to u′ instead. This protocol, which we denote with τu′ remains insecure
due to point 1 of the present Lemma. We now connect all predecessors
of u directly to v, remove the node u, and call the resulting protocol
τ ′. Clearly, τ ′ is identical to the protocol obtained as the u-v-bypass
of τ (the node u′ of τ ′ is exactly the node u of the bypass). Since τu′ is
insecure, there is a strategy Π for τu′ . Let g1, . . . , gn be the predecessor
nodes of u in τu′ (recall that u cannot be a variable). The adversary
can simulate performing the strategy Π for the protocol τu′ when the
protocol τ ′ is run as follows:
– Note that no queries to u appear, since τ ′ does not contain the
node u.
– For each query of some node different from v: Simply reply to the
request as the original strategy Π does.
– For each query of v: Due to construction of τ ′, the query to v in
τ ′ includes all arguments to a query of u in τu′ , i.e., the values for
g1, . . . , gn. Therefore, the adversary can use the given values for
g1, . . . , gn to simulate the query to u preceding the v-query in τu′ ,
and hence, when answering the actual query to v, has access to
the value of u computed by the strategy Π.
SinceΠ is successful against all possible schedules, in particular for all
schedules in which each u-query is directly followed by the v-query of
the corresponding local session, the simulated strategy Π successfully
returns a local session from S. Hence the adversary simply can output
this session.
3. Let Π be a strategy for the original protocol τ . We show how the
adversary can apply a modification of Π for the protocol τ ′. Let u be
the removed node, and let w be a node such that each u-predecessor
(in τ) is also a w-predecessor (in τ). In this case, each node different
from u receives the same number of queries, independently of whether
protocol τ or τ ′ is run. The adversary can simulate Π as follows: After
each query to w, simulate the corresponding query to u (as in the case
above, the adversary can obtain all necessary input-values for the
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simulated u-query from the actual w-query). Since u has no outgoing
edges, the value returned by Π for the u-query can be ignored. Since
Π is successful in particular for all scheduler that perform each u-
query directly after the w-query of the corresponding local session, the
simulation is correct and hence, as above, the adversary can output
the local session eventually returned by Π.
⊓⊔
Lemma D.4. Let τ ′ be a protocol obtained from τ by splitting an edge
(u, v). Then τ is secure if and only if τ ′ is secure.
Proof. Since reversing the splitting operation can be seen as applying a
bypass transformation and removing a removable node, we know that
τ can be obtained from τ ′ by these two operations. Therefore, due to
Lemma D.3, if τ ′ is insecure, then τ is insecure as well.
For the converse, assume that τ is insecure, and let w be the node
introduced in the process of splitting (u, v). Then clearly a successful
strategy Π for τ can be applied for τ ′ as follows:
– Answer every w-request with its input (i.e., the value for u).
– Due to the structure of τ , the v-euqry for each local session is per-
formed after the w-query of the same local session. Therefore, the re-
sult of the w-query—due to the point above, this is simply the value
for v—is then available for processing the v-query of the same local
session, and hence the strategy Π can be performed.
⊓⊔
The final “basic operation” we discuss is essentially a subset condi-
tion: Any “well-formed” subset of an insecure protocol is insecure, pro-
vided that the subset contains all the nodes required to keep track of the
variables relevant for the “subset protocol.”
Definition D.5. A subset τ ′ of a protocol τ is a closed sub-protocol of
τ if all predecessors of nodes in τ ′ are elements of τ ′, and there is a node
u ∈ τ ′ that has no successors in τ ′ and such that each path starting in τ ′
and ending in τ \ τ ′ visits u.
Lemma D.6. Let τ be insecure, and let τ ′ be a closed sub-protocol of τ .
Then τ ′ is insecure as well.
Proof. By definition of closed sub-protocols, every variable from Vars(τ ′)
is only connected to nodes in τ \ τ ′ via an outgoing edge of u. Since τ is
insecure, let Π be a strategy for τ . We construct a strategy Π ′ for τ ′ as
follows:
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– let all user sessions for the protocol τ ′ complete. Use the strategy Π
to determine the answers to the queries. Since τ ′ is predecessor-closed,
these queries do not require any values from nodes in τ \ τ ′.
– after all these sessions have completed: For each completed session,
simulate a user session in the remainder of the protocol, i.e., τ \ τ ′,
using arbitrary values as user inputs, and the previously-determined
return value of the query at u when needed (i.e., for the simulation of
Π at the successor nodes of u).
– Since Π is a correct strategy, Π eventually returns a local session I
of τ . The restriction of I to the variables in τ ′ is a local session of τ ′.
⊓⊔
We now give the proof of the embedding theorem:
Theorem 4.5. Let τ ′ be a secure protocol with a root, and let ϕ be an
embedding of τ ′ into a protocol τ . Then τ is secure as well.
Proof. We use the results established in this section, to prove that if τ
is insecure, then so is τ ′. We prove that τ ′ can be obtained from τ using
the operations bypassing, removing removable nodes, cloning, splitting,
reversing splitting, and taking closed sub-protocols. For this, we perform
a number of transformations on τ .
1. Remove intermediate nodes in τ . While in τ , there is a path ϕ(u)  
v  ϕ(w) for u,w ∈ τ ′ and v /∈ ϕ(τ ′), do the following:
– Let the path be ϕ(u) → v1 → v2 → · · · → vn = ϕ(w) with
vi /∈ ϕ(τ
′) for i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
– Use the bypass operation to remove the edges ϕ(u) → v1 and
v1 → v2, and introduce an edge w→ v2 for each w with w → v1.
– The remaining protocol remains insecure due to Lemma D.3.2.
Further, since
(a) there is no pair (u, v) for which there is a path ϕ(u) → ϕ(v)
with only intermediate nodes from τ \ ϕ(τ ′) after this change
but not before, and
(b) we still have the property that every path leaving range(τ ′)
does so via the ϕ-image of an output node of τ ′,
(c) predecessor nodes of ϕ-images of Vars(τ ′) are not affected,
ϕ remains a secure embedding.
– Continue the above operation until n = 1, i.e., the path ϕ(u) →
v1 → v2 → · · · → vn = ϕ(w) has been replaced with an edge
(ϕ(u), ϕ(w)).
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After this operation, there are no edges (ϕ(u), v) in τ anymore where
v /∈ ϕ(τ ′) and u has a successor in τ ′, and ϕ still is a secure embedding
of τ ′ into τ .
2. Make ϕ injective. While there are nodes u 6= v ∈ τ ′ with ϕ(u) = ϕ(v),
do the following, starting with the image of the root of τ ′ (i.e., we can
inductively assume that ϕ is injective on the successors of u and v,
and hence ϕ−1(u) and ϕ−1(v) are well-defined):
– Let w = ϕ(u) = ϕ(v)
– Introduce a new node w′ into τ
– For each edge (s,w) in τ , introduce an edge (s,w′)
– For each edge (w, t) such that there is no edge v → ϕ−1(t) in τ ′,
remove the edge (w, t) from τ and add the edge (w′, t)
– Redefine ϕ(u) as ϕ(u) = w′.
Since this transformation is exactly the cloning operation, it follows
from Lemma D.3.1 that the resulting protocol is still insecure. Clearly,
after the transformation, the modified ϕ is still an embedding, and still
there are no edges (ϕ(u), v) in τ where v /∈ ϕ(τ ′) and u has a successor
in τ ′, and ϕ still is a secure embedding of τ ′ into τ .
3. Remove irrelevant variables For each x ∈ Vars(τ) \ range(χ), remove
the variable x completely from τ . The protocol remains insecure, since
the adversary can always simulate a protocol run with the variable x
still present by using the value 0 for the input x. In addition, remove
all nodes from τ \ϕ(τ ′) that have no ancestor nodes that are a variable.
Clearly, τ remains insecure after this transformation since these nodes
cannot help the adversary’s strategy (consider a schedule since all
these nodes are queries before any other).
4. Transform the inputs of the copy of τ ′ to input nodes of τ . For each
x ∈ Vars(τ ′), all variables y from τ such that y 6= χ(x) and there is a
path from y to ϕ(x) have been removed in the step above. (Note that
for each x ∈ range(χ), there can be only one w ∈ Vars(τ ′) such that
x  ϕ(w) is a path in τ .) After this, the path from χ(x) to ϕ(x) in
τ consists of nodes with in-degree 1, remove all of these nodes. The
protocol remains insecure due to Lemma D.4. Now use Lemma D.3.2
to connect χ(x) to all successors of ϕ(x), remove all outgoing connec-
tions of ϕ(x), remove the node ϕ(x) using Lemma D.3.3 and rede-
fine ϕ(x) = χ(x). Clearly, the resulting protocol is still insecure and
ϕ remains an embedding. After this transformation, we have that if
u → ϕ(v) is an edge in τ , then u ∈ ϕ(τ ′), i.e., ϕ(τ ′) is predecessor-
closed: Each remaining node in τ \ ϕ(τ ′) has an ancestor χ(x) for
some x ∈ Vars(τ ′). Hence if u → ϕ(v) is an edge, then we have that
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χ(x) = ϕ(x) u→ (v). Such a path with u /∈ ϕ(τ ′) does not exist in
τ anymore after application of step 1.
Since all the above steps preserve the insecurity of τ and the fact
that ϕ is a secure embedding of τ ′ into τ , we therefore can without loss
of generality assume that τ is already the result of the above steps. In
particular, this implies:
– there are no paths ϕ(u) v  (w) in τ with v /∈ ϕ(τ ′),
– ϕ is injective,
– for each x ∈ Vars(τ ′), we have that χ(x) = ϕ(x) ∈ Vars(τ).
– no variable x ∈ Vars(τ) \ range(χ) is connected to a node in ϕ(τ ′).
– ϕ(τ ′) is predecessor-closed.
We now show that ϕ(τ ′) is a closed sub-protocol.
– By definition, ϕ(τ ′) is an induced subgraph, and by the above, ϕ(τ ′)
is predecessor-closed.
– We show that every path from ϕ(τ ′) to a node from τ \ ϕ(τ ′) visits
ϕ(rτ ′), where rτ ′ is the root of τ
′. Hence let ϕ(u) v be a path in τ ,
where v /∈ ϕ(τ ′), and u 6= rτ ′ . Since ϕ is an embedding, there is some
w ∈ τ ′ such that v  ϕ(w) is a path in τ . This is a contradiction,
since due to the above, there are no such paths in τ anymore after the
transformation.
Therefore, ϕ(τ ′) is indeed a closed sub-protocol. Since τ is insecure,
it follows from Lemma D.6 that ϕ(τ ′) is insecure as well.
Since all intermediate nodes on paths ϕ(u)  ϕ(v) that are no el-
ements from ϕ(τ ′) have been removed, and for all u → v, such a path
ϕ(u)  ϕ(v) exists in τ ′, it follows that if ϕ(u) → ϕ(v) is an edge in τ ,
then u → v is an edge in τ ′. We can without loss of generality assume
that the other direction is true as well, since adding edges only makes a
protocol more insecure. Since ϕ is injective, this implies that ϕ is in fact
an isomorphism. Therefore, τ ′ ≈ ϕ(τ ′) is insecure as well as claimed. ⊓⊔
E Security Proofs for Deep Protocols
We now give the proofs for the corollaries in Section 4.3. Both of these
results follow easily by applying the embedding technique introduced in
Section 4.2 to the results obtained for flat protocols in Section 4.1.
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Corollary 4.6. Let τ be a layered protocol with levels L0, . . . , Ln with
some i such that Li = I1∪I2 with Vars(I1)∩Vars(I2) = ∅ and |Vars(I1)| >
|I1|, |Vars(I2)| > |I2|. Then τ is secure.
Proof. This result follows directly from Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 4.5:
Consider the protocol τ ′ = g(f1(x
1
1, . . . , x
1
k1
, . . . , fn(x
n
1 , . . . , x
n
kn
), where{
xi1, . . . , x
i
ki
}
is the set of variables x such that x  fi is a path in τ .
Then, due to Theorem 4.2, the protocol τ ′ is secure. Clearly, the function
ϕ defined with ϕ(x) = x for all x ∈ Vars(τ), ϕ(fi) = fi for all relevant
i, and ϕ(g) = rτ where rτ is the root of τ (if τ does not have a root, we
add one connected to all nodes of τ without an outgoing edge), with the
function χ(x) = x for all x ∈ Vars(τ) constitutes a secure embedding of
τ ′ into τ . Therefore, Theorem 4.5 implies that τ is secure. ⊓⊔
Corollary 4.7. Let τ be a layered protocol with levels L0, . . . , Ln with
some i such that for each f ∈ Li, there is a variable xf ∈ Vars(f) \
Vars(Li\{f}) and there is no f ∈ Li with Vars(f) ⊇ Vars(Li)\
{
xf ′ | f
′ ∈ Li
}
.
Then τ is secure.
Proof. This result follows directly from Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 4.5:
Let Li = {f1, . . . , fm}, and for each fj ∈ Li, let Vars(fj) =
{
xj1, . . . , x
j
kj
}
.
By theorem 4.3, the protocol τ ′ := g(f1(x
1
1, . . . , x
1
k1
), . . . , fm(x
m
1 , . . . , x
m
km
))
is secure. Due to Theorem 4.5, it suffices to construct a secure embedding
ϕ of τ ′ into τ . We define this embedding by ϕ(x) = x for all x ∈ Vars(τ),
ϕ(fj) = fj for all fi ∈ Li, and ϕ(g) = rτ where rτ is the root of τ (if τ
does not have a root, we add one just as in the proof of Corollary 4.6).
We define the function χ as χ(x) = x for each x ∈ Vars(τ). Clearly, this
constitutes an embedding, and hence τ is secure as claimed. ⊓⊔
